Justice K.S.Puttaswamy(Retd) v. Union of India

Chief Justice Jagdish S. Khehar, Justice Jasti Chelameswar, Justice Sharad A. Bobde, Justice Rajesh K. Agrawal, Justice Rohinton F. Nariman, Justice Abhay M. Sapre, Justice (Dr.) Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Sanjay K. Kaul, Justice Syed A. Nazeer

The Union of India, through the adoption of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 and the Aadhar card scheme, sought to collect demographic and biometric data of individuals to reduce leakages in the distribution of various public benefits. These measures were challenged before a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court on the ground that the data collection violated individual’s right to privacy. Considering the pronouncements in M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate (Eight-Judge Bench) (“M.P. Sharma”) (1954 INSC 24) and Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Six-Judge Bench) (“Kharak Singh”) (1962 INSC 389) where the Court observed that the right to privacy is not protected under our Constitution, the Three-Judge Bench referred the matter to the Constitution Bench (Five Judges).

The observation made in M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh were based on the judgment of A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (“A. K. Gopalan”) (1950 INSC 13), which was held to be incorrect by the Supreme Court in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India (Eleven-Judge Bench) (“R. C. Cooper”) (1970 INSC 18). Further, in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (Seven-Judge Bench) (“Maneka Gandhi”) (1978 INSC 16), the majority view in Kharak Singh was overruled. However, since the decisions of a larger bench (M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh) cannot be ignored by a smaller Bench, the present Constitution Bench placed the question before a Nine-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court.

The Nine-Judge Bench wrote five opinions. All nine judges unanimously upheld the right to privacy as a part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, and a protected right across the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution (Fundamental Rights). The Supreme Court held that privacy is inherent and inseparable from dignified human existence. A majority of judges agreed that an individual's privacy can only be interfered with by a measure based on a law, is necessary to secure a legitimate government interest, and the interference with privacy is proportionate to the government’s objective. Justice Chandrachud authored a plurality opinion on behalf of Chief Justice Khehar, Justice Agrawal, Justice Nazeer, and himself. Justice Chelameswar, Justice Bobde, Justice Nariman, Justice Kaul, and Justice Sapre all authored separate concurring opinions.

The decisions in M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh

The decisions in M. P. Sharma and Kharak Singh were based on the view of the majority in A. K. Gopalan, which was later overruled in R. C. Cooper and Maneka Gandhi (¶24 J. Chandrachud, ¶7 J. Bobde). A. K. Gopalan treated each article in Part III of the Constitution as embodying distinct, non-overlapping freedoms (¶13 J. Chandrachud). Consequently, the decisions of M. P. Sharma and Kharak Singh did not recognize the interconnected nature of fundamental rights, meaning they should not be read in isolation. However, in R. C. Cooper, the Court rejected the notion that fundamental rights operate in watertight compartments (¶¶21,150 J. Chandrachud). Therefore, the judgments in M. P. Sharma and Kharak Singh cannot impede the interpretation of the fundamental right to privacy within Part III of the Constitution (¶¶19-24 J. Chandrachud, ¶7 J. Chelameswar, ¶7 J. Bobde, ¶¶35-38 J. Nariman).

In M.P. Sharma, the Supreme Court refused to read the right to privacy as part of the right against self-incrimination in Article 20(3) of the Constitution (¶26 J. Chandrachud, ¶7 J. Chelameswar, ¶4 J. Bobde). However, the Court in M.P. Sharma refrained from making any observations regarding the import of the fundamental right to privacy under Part III of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in the present case found that M.P. Sharma dealt only with Article 20(3) and not with other fundamental rights (¶¶26,185 J. Chandrachud, ¶7 J. Chelameswar, ¶¶4, 7-9 J. Bobde, ¶¶25-27 J. Nariman). Hence, the judgment of M.P. Sharma does not fall in the way of reading the right to privacy in Part III of the Constitution (¶¶ 25-26,185 J. Chandrachud, ¶7 J. Chelameswar, ¶¶7-9 J. Bobde, ¶¶25-27 J. Nariman).

The Supreme Court held that the majority in Kharak Singh was accurate in stating that Article 21 assures that dignity is essential for the development and evolution of a human being. However, it was not correct to hold that the right to privacy is not part of our Constitution (¶89 J. Chandrachud, ¶9 J. Chelameswar, ¶6 J. Bobde, ¶42 J. Nariman). The decision in Kharak Singh was overruled to this extent.

The judgments of Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1975 INSC 74), R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994 INSC 455), and People’s Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India (1996 INSC 1509), have affirmed the right to privacy as a constitutionally protected right under Article 21. Through Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2007 INSC 520), the Court had recognized constitutional protection to privacy in physical as well as mental sense (¶61 J. Chandrachud, ¶10 J. Bobde, ¶75 J. Nariman).

Affirmation of the Constituent Assembly is not a necessity

The Supreme Court rejected the argument that whatever is not found in the text of the Constitution cannot become part of the Constitution ( ¶17 J. Chelameswar). It held that it cannot be conclusively stated from the Constituent Assembly debates that the Constituent Assembly rejected the existence of the right to privacy (¶148 J. Chandrachud, ¶17 J. Chelameswar). The relevance of the Constituent Assembly debates may be limited as the right to privacy must be assessed within the contemporary context (¶151 J. Chandrachud, ¶44 J. Nariman, ¶31 J. Kaul).

Privacy is a facet of Article 21

The Supreme Court disagreed with the respondents that there is no concept of ‘privacy.’ The Court held that the mere absence of the definition of ‘privacy’ cannot prevent the Court from recognizing the right of privacy and its contours. (¶¶48-50 J. Nariman, ¶¶19-21 J. Bobde, ¶10 J. Kaul). The Court held that privacy is the foundational condition for exercising the right to life and personal liberty (¶24 J. Bobde, ¶91 J. Chandrachud). Dignity, which lies at the heart of the Constitution and is expressly recognized in the Preamble and Article 21, cannot be safeguarded without privacy. The framers of the Constitution envisioned a society where liberty and dignity are central to the fulfilment of constitutional values (¶107 J. Chandrachud). Privacy, as a core value intertwined with life and liberty, ensures that dignity is upheld (¶107 J. Chandrachud, ¶¶25-30 J. Bobde, ¶48 J. Nariman, ¶40 J. Kaul).

The Supreme Court stated that the right to privacy includes the preservation of personal intimacies, sanctity of family life, marriage, procreation, and sexual orientation (¶169 J. Chandrachud). Justice Chelameswar opined that the right to privacy consists of three facets i.e., repose (freedom from unwarranted stimuli), sanctuary (protection against intrusive observation), and intimate decision-making (autonomy over personal choices) (¶36 J. Chelameswar). Justice Nariman also highlighted that privacy rights extend beyond a person’s body to informational privacy. He emphasised that individuals have the right to control the dissemination of personal information, and any unauthorised use of such material may result in an infringement of this right (i.e., informational privacy) (¶81, J. Nariman, ¶177 J. Chandrachud, ¶11, J. Kaul).

Statutory protection cannot deny constitutional protection

The Supreme Court rejected the argument that since various statutory laws acknowledge the right to privacy, declaring it as a fundamental right in Part III is not required. The Court held that constitutional rights are not subject to the whims of a particular government. Unlike a statutory right, a constitutional right cannot be modified, annulled, or curtailed by the legislative majority (¶153 J. Chandrachud, ¶19 J. Chelameswar, ¶39 J. Bobde).

Restriction on the right

The Supreme Court held that the right to privacy is not absolute; it is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the State to protect legitimate State interests (¶43 J. Chelameswar, ¶86 J. Nariman, ¶72 J. Kaul). The Court held that all limitations on privacy are subject to three requirements derived from Article 21. First, there must exist a validly enacted law that authorises the infringement of privacy. Second, the infringement must be necessary to meet a legitimate aim. Third, the means or methods of the State must be proportionate to the government’s legitimate aim (¶180 J. Chandrachud). Justice Kaul also held that there should be procedural safeguards against the infringement of the right (¶71 J. Kaul).

Prepared by Sakshi Komal Dubey (Intern)

Centre for Research and Planning, Supreme Court of India

Judgment Summaries are prepared to help promote a better understanding of the decisions of the Supreme Court of India. They do not form part of the Court's decision or reasons and are not for use in legal proceedings.

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